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Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of
Terror. By Michael Vincent Hayden. New York: Penguin Press,
2016. ISBN: 9781594206566. Index. Pp. xiv, 448. $30.00.
Playing to the Edge is authored by a 1980 graduate of the National
Intelligence University (NIU), Michael Hayden, the only person ever to serve
as head of both the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). And he did this during very tumultuous times including the
controversy over enhanced interrogation, and the security breach by the
traitor Edward Snowden, which he describes as “the greatest hemorrhaging of
legitimate American secrets in the history of the republic” (p. 421). Hayden
has had a life-long career in intelligence. In the 1980s, he served as the Air
Force attaché in Bulgaria where he recalled that after having his car tailed for
several hours by the Bulgarian security services, they pulled up alongside and
motioned that it was time to get lunch.
Much of the book discusses the Congress, the press, and the handling of
numerous public controversies regarding intelligence. These experiences
gave him a sober view of the press. “Be careful what you tell these people.
Some are less interested in honest dialogue than listening to rebut and accuse
and discredit” (p. 400). He writes about a hypothetical discussion with an
intelligence case officer: “It’s authorized by the president [and the] attorney
general [and] Congress” have been briefed. But “have you run it by the ACLU?
What does the New York Times editorial Board think?” (p. 382). But he also
used the press. He lauds the website, http://ciasaveslives.com (p. 397) and
with former U. S. Attorney General Mike Mukasey published a powerful
editorial in the Wall Street Journal.
On Congress he notes that “One congressman wanted to know whether or not
CIA complied with ‘buy America’ legal requirements for construction
materials used in black sites overseas” (p. 229). Advice for briefing Senator
Wyden: “Speak slowly” (p. 183). He often expresses frustration. “There are
days when a director of CIA is inclined to think that he is running a large
public affairs, legal, and legislative liaison enterprise attached to small
operational and analytic elements” (p.232).
Hayden covers NSA controversies surrounding the Prism and Stellarwind
programs and his book is full of details regarding how public policy was
discussed and decided. The same is done on the CIA side, where enhanced
interrogation and targeted killings stormed into the public debate. He has
clear and compelling views on these matters. On enhanced interrogation:
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“[T]he facts of the case are that the use of these techniques against these
terrorists made us safer. It really did work” (p. 386). He similarly opines that
“[T]he targeted killing program has been the most precise application of
firepower in the history of armed conflict” (p. 341). Further, he believes that
“The United States will need to keep this capacity and be willing to use it” (p.
344). He expresses irony concerning the prohibition of CIA detentions: “We
had finally succeeded in making it so legally difficult and so politically
dangerous to grab and hold someone that we would simply default to the kill
switch to take terrorists off the battlefield” (p. 242).
The book does not go into detail regarding operations. Hayden doesn’t “talk.”
He devotes an entire chapter on intelligence thinking surrounding the
bombing of the North Korean-built nuclear reactor near Al-Kibir, Syria, but
never mentions who did it. This fits with his general view of the value of
secrecy. “Espionage thrives in the shadows, and secrecy is an essential
component of its success. Despite a latent plus side (legitimacy, support,
understanding), American intelligence has traditionally judged the minus side
of going public (decreased effectiveness) be determinative” (p. 422). He
repeats the advice Richard Helms gave to Robert Gates: “Never go home at
night without asking yourself, ‘Where is the mole?’” (p. 278).
Playing to the Edge is full of interesting anecdotes and descriptions of notable
persons. President Bush liked to call him “Mikey” as in “Mikey, get in here!”
(p. 372). On Attorney General Holder: “messianic in his focus, politically
tone-deaf, and indifferent to contrary evidence and views” (p. 395). On John
McCain: “…the election of John McCain would have been more disruptive to
the way American produced intelligence than the election of Barack Obama”
(p. 354). He describes Rahm Emanuel, Chief of Staff, congratulating CIA on
the targeted killing of an al-Qaeda member (p. 342). He notes of Abdullah II
of Jordan that “when the king is in the United States, he motorcycles our back
roads in the company of a close American friend, a former CIA senior” (p.
322). On King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia views of Iran, Hayden notes: “cut off
the head of the snake” (p. 320). As for Obama and Netanyahu: “I suspected
that the two men talked past each other” (p. 299). Director Leon Panetta
trying to encourage CIA employees potentially threatened by release of
information regarding enhanced interrogation was like a “pep rally in the
Führer bunker” (p. 382). On former CIA directors “It would be hard to get
them all to agree that a certain day was Tuesday” (p. 393). On angling to start
briefing candidate Obama “we would work to get access to him and then
create as many of what we crudely called ‘aw, shit’ moments as possible” (p.
356). On the Iranians: “They will cheat, of course. It’s what they do” (p. 309).
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On the head of Afghan National Directorate of Security when visiting Colonial
Williamsburg: “Where are the walls?” “Walls?” “Yes. To protect them from
the people” (p.316).
Regarding NSA, he mentions “the director’s massive conference table, which
looks like it was ripped off the set of Dr. Strangelove” (p. 172). He describes a
secret visit to Pakistan with Mike McConnell. Upon departure, their jet
needed to get fuel: “The crew had forgotten their government credit card—you
can’t make this stuff up—and the Pakistanis wouldn’t budge” (p. 348). So the
DCI and DNI were sitting on the tarmac in Pakistan with empty fuel tanks.
He describes National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) as having an “…arcane
style [and] language” (p. 297). But he himself has a quirky habit of adding the
word “period” to the end of sentences, as in: “This does not authorize the
collection of content, period” (p. 408), referring to the 215 program; “[O]ff the
table. Period.” (p.381); and “[W]aterboarding . . . hadn’t been used for almost
five years. Period” (p. 242).
Playing to the Edge is a valuable insiders account of how the intelligence
community navigated through difficult years during the Bush and Obama
administrations. It is primarily about the practical handling of public
controversy and the nature of the public debate regarding the role of
intelligence in American society. So it is perfect reading for anyone interested
in public policy. In addition, it provides a bird’s eye view of challenges faced
by managers in intelligence, and some of the practical ways to handle reform.
General Hayden ultimately is an optimist. And he believes in people. In spite
of all the challenges to the intelligence community, he writes that “Good
people overcome imperfect structures” (p. 178). But don’t look to him for any
leaks about intelligence. That’s not what he does.
Edward Roche
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